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into a choice between 'strong predestination ism ' and a coeval interdependent
demiurge." So the metaphysical efforts to think an incomposite (or simple)
being, whose uniqueness is rooted in that negative first-level assertion (16873), and to do so from an analysis of existing things which leads one to
recognize their existential composition, promises a rich theological payoff.
Yet here one must attend to Braine's explicit "contrast between a rationalist
metaphysics attempting to build ... on certain univocal general principles
bestraddling all subject-matters uniformly and an Aristotelian metaphysics
utilizing structurally interrelated sets of analogous concepts" (210). What is
at stake here is a crucial difference in the way one approaches human knowledge of generality: is it "exhibited primarily in judgements about particular
cases" (257), and so "realized in a spread of analogous applications of
principle" or is it expressed "in some single univocal principle" (262)?
Braine, with Aquinas (213-19) and Wittgenstein, comes down decisively for
the first, while "platonists," who play the lasting foil for his sustained argument, line up with Scotus and Leibniz (263) on the other side, carrying with
them (I would suggest) all too many graduate students who are introduced
into professional philosophy by way of -isms rather than by way of examples
and careful consideration of the context and point of diverse philosophical
arguments. In that respect, Braine's manner of proceeding, rigorous as it is,
asks more than following its tight reasoning; or rather, the upshot of allowing
oneself to follow the arguments will be a challenge to settled perspectives
about philosophical argument itself. That is, I take it, the import of his
insistence on the primacy of first-order over second-order considerations
(225n.), and of an "a posteriori approach which considers the conditions of
temporal existence" (378) over various a priori approaches associated with
"platonism" and identified with Scotus. Braine shows better than anyone I
know just how crucial such a difference is for philosophical theology, and
since that difference cuts so deep, just how relevant other parts of philosophy
are to executing a philosophy of religion which will be adequate to the
demands of a theology faithful to the newness of Christian revelation-to say
nothing of the newness of Jewish or Muslim faith as well.

Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, by
Sallie McFague. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. Pp. xv and 224.
JOSEPH RUNZO, Claremont Graduate School and
Chapman College, California.
This is an important book. Addressing some of the most trenchant, current
issues in philosophical theology, it offers an articulate and interesting exposition of "metaphorical theology" which not only challenges traditional theo-
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logical assumptions and formulations but develops an alternative account,
both evocative and provocative, of the world as God's body, and of God as
mother, God as lover, and God as friend.
The first half of the book addresses meta-theological questions underlying
metaphorical theology; within the encompassing framework of the "model"
of the world as God's body, the second half develops the three "models" of
God as mother, lover, and friend. Beginning with an understanding of theology as construction, McFague develops the notion of theology as metaphorical, comparing this form of theology to painting a picture. Thus metaphorical
theology is "mostly fiction." Then, based on a conception of Christian faith
as most fundamentally the claim that "there is a [personal] power ... which is
on the side of life and its fulfillment" (p. x), McFague suggests that we must
now look for new models of God which are credible for our age. For she
argues that the classical Western monarchical model of God both views God
as too distant and uninvolved with the world, and leads to hierarchical, "dualistic" thinking which encourages cleavages that support oppression (e.g.
rich/poor, white/colored, male/female, and Christian versus non-Christian).
Whatever our theological models, McFague says that we must avoid the "tyranny of the absolutizing imagination" and understand that rather than being true
or false, our models are instead either better or worse for our faith/or our age.
A contemporary model(s) of God will be successful to the extent that it (1) is
coherent, comprehensive, (2) encourages the preservation and fulfillment of the
world, and (3) expresses a Christian understanding of "God as a Thou who is
related to the world in a unified and interdependent way" (p. 19).
McFague first develops the model of the world as God's body. Emphasizing
God's immanence, this model powerfully portrays a God in intimate and
caring relation to the world, and correspondingly, McFague suggests, supports an ethics directed toward responsibility and care-an ethics which she
sees as more female, rather than the more traditional (male) concern with
"competing rights." This leads to three other models. God as mother-emphasizing a nurturing closeness more than the often disinterested God of
father imagery. God as lover-since the deepest human relationships are
between lovers, this, says McFague, should be a central model for the
God/world relation, a model emphasizing the value of the other. And God as
friend-an "astounding" model, says McFague, for this says that God likes
you, desiring a "companionable sensibility."
McFague describes the metaphorical theologian as part poet and part philosopher: constructing imaginative models for contemporary Christian faith,
yet needing to show the coherence, comprehensiveness, and systematic application of those models. Put in these terms, the position McFague stakes
out is rich in metaphor and poetic evocation, but at times less successful
philosophically. McFague holds that the essence of metaphorical theology is
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the recognition that our concepts cannot directly refer to God. This indirectness of all talk of God is what she calls "metaphorical," and the task of
metaphorical theology is to "identify primary metaphors and models [i.e. a
metaphor with "staying power"] from contemporary experience
... [which] ... express Christian faith for our day" (p. 35). There are three
difficulties with this project of metaphorical theology.
First, consider McFague's seminal claim that "God-language can refer only
through the detour of a description that properly belongs elsewhere" (p. 34).
This claim is too strong. It seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the nature
of metaphors. While a metaphor does not provide a direct description of its
referent, a metaphor is only used properly and can only be successful if there
are certain features which the intended referent, and the normal referent of
the metaphor when it is taken literally, have in common. Thus to say "all the
world's a stage" is in part to say that our lives have some qualities which are
just like being on a stage-though of course the world is not a stage, just as,
McFague notes, God is not a mother (or father). So while theological metaphors do not simply provide literal descriptions, the intent must be that they
literally apply to something which, it is supposed, has important features in
common with the intended referent, God.
A related, epistemological problem is McFague's insistence that traditional
divine predication "properly" refers "only to our existence, not God's" (p. 39),
that e.g. "knowledge" properly refers to human capacities, not to God's. Even
if we cannot know that our theological constructions do successfully refer to
God, we also cannot know that they do not, or could not, properly refer to God.
It may be that no names-mother or father, creator or lover, judge or friend"describe, define, or limit the divine nature," but I take it that it is part of the
driving force of theology that we hope and expect that our language will in some
measure succeed in referring to and partially, however imperfectly, describing,
the divine. Otherwise theology will not even be poetry, and silence the wisest
course of action. This danger becomes apparent in McFague's claim that we
always see God through pictures, not directly. For if our "pictures" of the divine
never properly refer to God (whether we can know this or not) then we have lost
God: all we will have is our pictures.
A second difficulty arises when McFague develops specific models within
metaphorical theology. Initially she states that the models of the world as
God's body, and God as mother, lover, and friend are several among many
possible valuable and instructive models for contemporary Christian faith.
Yet McFague's later assessment of each suggests that these are superior
models in an era of ecological awareness and nuclear threat: e.g. "all of
us ... have the womb as our first home, all of us are born from ... [and] fed by
our mothers. What better imagery could there be for expressing the most basic
reality of existence: That we live and move and have our being in God?" (p.
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106). Since she is offering models, and given her background assumption of
the historicity of human thought, it might be better to state directly that for
her, or for many, the models she proposes are illuminating; for others, different, even conflicting, models may be equally insightful.
Finally, conceptual clarity is sometimes sacrificed in the otherwise quite
rewarding search for rich theological metaphors. To some extent, McFague
accepts this, arguing that our beliefs and behavior are more influenced by
images than by concepts, and that metaphors give "a precision and persuasive
power to the construct of God which concepts alone cannot" (p. 38). But at
times key terms are left unexplained and important conclusions reached with
little argument.
McFague employs an analogy for the seminal model of the world as God's
body: God is to the world as our self is to our bodies. She explains this at
one point by saying that God's body is the entire universe; God is a self whose
intentions are expressed in the universe. At other points she states that God's
body "is not matter or spirit but the matrix out of which everything that is
evolves" (p. 111), and that "in some sense God is physical (as well as beyond
the physical)" (p. 112). While the metaphors of mother, lover and friend are
well articulated and consequently more clearly theologically potent, this central "body" metaphor is problematic and confused.
The meta-theological problems we saw above surface again here. Contrary
to McFague's general analysis of metaphor, the body metaphor seems to be
meant literally; talk about the "matrix" of the universe appears to be direct
divine predication. And while on her account we could not know it to be true,
that God's body is this matrix, contrary to McFague's epistemology this
appears to be a truth-claim about God. Additionally, though, the foundational
relation of Godself to God's body is not explained. McFague denies any
mind-body dualism. (Though she partially retracts this by saying that we are
spirits that "possess" bodies.) If the Godself/world relation is not a form of
dualism, is this for instance some version of the "double-aspect" theory of,
say, Spinoza, or more recently, Strawson? We are not told.
McFague supports the notion of the world as God's body in part by suggesting that in view of the contemporary understanding of personhood as
embodied, a disembodied God is less credible than an embodied God. However, McFague's line of argument for the theological use of metaphor rather
than direct predication assumes that God is other, if not wholly other, than
us. Why then should we suppose that the ontological status of God's personhood is like that of human persons? Further, McFague draws some puzzling
geocentric and anthropocentric conclusions from this view of an embodied
God. She says that we have "the responsibility to care for God's body, our
world" (p. 73) and that humans, as "the only conscious ones among the
beloved," have "ultimate power over good and evil" since in the throes of
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nuclear insanity we can be the "uncreators of life" (p. 138). This raises a host
of puzzles. Is God's body the whole universe, or only the earth? If the former,
then how significant would the destruction of life on earth be in the cosmic
scale? If the latter, is it not rather egocentric to regard our home planet as
God's body? Isn't it improbable that homo sapiens are the only "conscious
beings in the universe"? And if there are other conscious beings, or even life
forms throughout the universe, is it not hubris to suppose that we could be
the "uncreators of life"? Just as McPague argues that the ethic of liberation
theology should be expanded beyond concern for humanity to include all life
on earth, the respect for life exemplified in this admirable global theology
should be extended to responsible respect for any life in the universe.
The models of the world as God's body, and God as mother, lover and
friend conjointly imply that we are partners with God as a Friend of us and
our world. This is a refreshing and powerful vision of the love and care of
God, and of human interdependence and responsible action within and with
the world. However, despite McFague's disclaimers-that we cannot cure the
world, that if some had perfect health, others would not-she offers a questionably optimistic view of humans as saviors of the world, mending its
"fragmented body." To exhort and encourage the goodness of humankind is
a high theological calling; to imply that the human greed that pollutes the
earth and seriously contemplates nuclear holocaust will be reformed by a
vision of a world-wide community of equal persons with reverence for all
life seems to ignore the very history that is our birthmark. Followers of Adam
Smith may be wrong, but that does not make their calculating assessment of
elemental human self-centeredness inaccurate.
McFague may fail in the task she sets to "unseat" traditional monarchical and
trinitarian language. Much remains to be done to clarify the model of the world
as God's body. And she makes a stronger case for the models of God as mother,
lover, and friend as illuminating alternatives to more traditional models, than as
the best models for our time. But the excellence of this book lies in its bold
exposition of faith in God as the belief that "The universe is neither malevolent
nor indifferent but is on the side of life and its fulfillment," and in its balanced
and subtly detailed portrayal of a God who is both transcendent and immanent,
neither too distant from, nor too subsumed in, the world.
McFague sets out to construct models of God which counter the self-annihilating posture of our race, models which encourage relationships and display our interdependence with each other, with the world, and with God. She
succeeds. In Models of God, the world as God's body, and God as mother,
lover, and friend, become challenging, compelling theological models.

